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present case. For a number of years the public interest test was the
exclusive basis for decision, and today if that test is completely
satisfied there seems to be no reason that it can not be the sole basis
of decision in Meiman. In light of this observation, it is extremely
doubtful that the Meiman decision, although ineptly articulated in
places, will ever return to haunt the Court.
Secondly, it appears that this decision, in spite of its lack of legal
exactness, is perhaps farsighted. In recent legal history many areas of
the lav have evolved to a point where the protection of the individual
is the primary concern. For example, in criminal law the rights of the
defendant have been greatly magnified under the fifth and seventh
amendments and in tort law the rights of the unborn are beginning to
be realized. Therefore, it is not surprising that this legal development
has progressed to exculpatory agreements used by the medical profession. However, this is not a case of change for change's sake. There
are several sound reasons for holding medical centers, hospitals and
doctors liabile for their torts in spite of their exculpatory agreements.
The first of these reasons is that the party who realizes his liability
will probably be more careful in applying treatment than the exculpated party. Second, employers will be more careful in selecting
their employees if they realize their liability under respondeat
superior. Finally, while the cost of an injury would be a tremendous
expense for the individual patient, the insurance carrier of the hospital
or the hospital itself could more effectively absorb and spread the cost.
In light of these two observations one may suspect that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has heard the jury charge by a mountain
judge, "Do right;" for, the Court seems to have done right even
though it stuttered in doing so.
Bruce Montgomery Reynolds
INCOmE TAXATION-ScHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GxANTsOF TnxAstmY REGuATiN.-Westinghouse Electric Corporation offered a program of financial assistance to employees of their
FEDERAL
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Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. That program, consisting of two
phases, was designed to attract new employees seeking to further their

education and to give advanced training to employees of Bettis in
engineering, physics, or mathematics. During the initial phase, the
employee would pursue a course of study at a local university on
company time. The company would pay tuition as well as other incidental expenses.
When all preliminary work for the doctoral degree had been
completed, the employee could opt for the final phase, for which an
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educational leave of absence would be granted. During this period he
would receive a "stipend" from Westinghouse based on a percentage of
his prior salary as well as various other amounts depending on his
family's size. Seniority and fringe benefits would be maintained. In
return, the employee would be required to submit progress reports,
have the subject of his dissertation approved by the company, and
return to work for his employer for a period of at least two years
upon completion of his leave.
Richard Johnson and two other employees1 of Westinghouse
were granted leave under this program during 1961-62 in order to
receive their doctoral degrees in engineering. Each received at least
eighty percent of his former pay while participating. Westinghouse
accountants listed the payments as "indirect labor" and deducted
them on its corporate tax return. Johnson and his fellow employees
filed claims for refund, declaring that the payments were "scholarships" under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter the 1954 Code] and that they were excludable from gross income. The claims were rejected and suit was fied in federal district
court against the District Director of Internal Revenue. Upon instruction by the trial judge as to the requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c), 2 the jury found that the amounts received were in
fact taxable income. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
I Richard A. Wolfe and Martin L. Pomerantz were also parties to the action.
In addition, the wives of all three men were included since joint returns were
filed for the years in question.
2The applicable provision of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) (1956)
reads:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the
benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount
paid or allowed to, or on behaf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compensation
for past, present, or future employment services or represents payment
for services which are subject to the direction or supervision of the
grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of
the grantor.
However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section
117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the
education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and the
amout provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is required to furnish
reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the fact that the results of
his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit to the grantor
shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character of such
amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
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regulation was invalid and that as a matter of law, the amounts
received were clearly "scholarships" under section 117 of the 1954
Code.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the conflict of
that holding and the holdings of other circuits4 on similar facts.

Held: Reversed. The payments were clearly compensatory in nature
and thus subject to federal taxation. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741
(1969).
As a general premise, prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the

amount received by means of scholarships and fellowships was excluded from gross income. The courts and the Treasury Department
regarded the grants as gifts unless services were required of the
recipient. This admixture of gift and compensation led to the "gift
test" employed in virtually all of the cases based on the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Unfortunately, this test led to the rejection of
many intended scholarships since any work performed in the course
of study was suspect.5 A 1951 revenue ruling is illustrative of the state
of the law prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code:
The amount of a grant or fellowship award is includible in
gross income unless it can be established that such amount is
a gift. If a grant or fellowship award is made for the training
and education of an individual, either as a part of his program in acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered as consideration
therefor, the amount of the grant or award is a gift which is excludable from gross income. However, when the recipient of
a grant or fellowship applies his skill and training to advance research, creative work, or some other project or activity, the essential elements of a gift as contemplated by . . . the Internal
Revenue Code are not present, and the amount of the grant
or fellowship is includible in the recipient's gross income. 6
In 1954, the present Internal Revenue Code was enacted which
included section 117.7 That section provides, inter alia, that gross in3Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968).

4 See discussion infra note 23.
5

In Ephraim Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952),

the Tax Court held that

services rendered for the grants would be considered in determining the taxability

of the stipend. Payments to a taxpayer for research work were considered gifts in
George Winchester Stone, Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954), since no control was retained by the grantor and no employer-employee relationship existed. This holding
was adopted by the Internal Revenue Service in Rev. Rul. 57-286, 1957-1 Cum.
BULL. 497. See also Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220 (1954).
6 1951-2 Cm. BULL. 8, 10.

7 For the convenience of the reader, the entire section is set forth below.
SEC.

117. SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLowsHp GRANTs
(a) General Rule.-In the case of an individual, gross income does

not include-

(1) any amount received-

(Cntnued on

ext pae)
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come is not to include any amount received as a scholarship or
fellowship while the recipient is enrolled at any educational institution. The exceptions are categorized by degree and non-degree
candidates. For an individual who is a candidate for a degree, any
portion of the amount which represents compensation for services in
the nature of part-time employment must be included in gross income unless these services are required of all candidates and their
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations;
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for(A) travel,

(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
(b) Limitations.(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.-In the case
of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151(e) (4)), subsection (a) shall not apply
to that portion of any amount received which represents payment for
teaching, research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are required of all
candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship
grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree,
such teaching, research, or other services shall not be regarded as parttime employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.-In the
case of an individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)) subsection (a)
shall apply only if the condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and
then only within the limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
(A) Conditions for exclusion.-The grantor of the scholarship or fellowship grant is(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3)
which is exempt from tax under section 501(a),
(ii) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or
multinational educational and cultural foundation or commission created or continued pursuant to the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or an instrumentality or agency
thereof, or a State, a territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District
of Columbia.
(B) Extent of exclusion.-The amount of the scholarship
or fellowship grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable
year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of
months for which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or felloswhip grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under subsection (a) after the recipient has
been entitled to exclude under this section for a period of 36 months
(whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151(e) (4)).
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performance is a prerequisite for the degree.8 In the case of nondegree candidates, the grantor of the scholarship must be some taxexempt or governmental organization and the excludable amount received is limited to $300 per month for a maximum of 36 months.9
The House Report preceding the promulgation of the 1954 Code made
it quite clear that those receiving grants from benefactors requiring
a student to work in a part-time capacity must include these payments for services in his gross income. 10 The House version went on
to state that if the labor performed was for the educational advance-

ment of the individual, the amount received would be excluded."'
This provision was amended by the Senate to apply to degree candidates exclusively. Further, if teaching, research, or other services were

required for the degree, they would not be considered part-time em-

2
ployment within the meaning of the statute.'

To the Treasury Department was left the task of defining the
terms contained in section 117 and outlining the limits of the exclusion. The terms basic to the statute, "scholarship" and "fellowship",
are defined in lay terms. Moreover, the definitions conform to their
ordinary meanings.' 3 Apparently, then, if the grant is used to further
8
9

INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 117(b) (1).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 117 (b)(2).

11i
1o
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A37 (1954).
No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1954).
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (a) and C).
(a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate or
a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies. The term
includes the value of contributed services and accommodations (see
paragraph (d) of this section) and the amount of tuition, matriculation,
and other fees which are furnished or remitted to a student to aid him
in pursuing his studies. The term also includes any amount received in
the nature of a family allowance as a part of a scholarship. However,
the term does not include any amount provided by an individual to aid
a relative, friend, or other individual in pursuing his studies where the
grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations. If an
educational institution maintains or participates in a plan whereby the
tuition of a child of a faculty member of such institution is remitted by
any other participating educational institution attended by such child, the
amount of the tuition so remitted shall be considered to be an amount
received as a scholarship.
12 S. REP.
3

(c) Fellowship grant. A fellowship grant generally means an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the
pursuit of study or research. The term includes the value of contributed
services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and
the amount of tuition, matriculation, an d other fees which are furnished
or remitted to an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research. The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a
family allowance as a part of a fellowship grant. However, the term does
not include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative,
friend, or other individual in the pursuit of study or research where the
grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations.
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the education of the individual, it is not to be considered a part of
gross income unless it is paid to the student for services rendered in
part-time employment. Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4 lists several exceptions to the above rule and in so doing plays a dominant role
in the present state of the law.14 Within the final category of exception
lies the fountainhead of confusion for the Service and courts alike:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily
for the benefit of the grantor. [Almounts paid or allowed to, or
on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies

or research are considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the
primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and

the amount provided by the grantor for such does not represent compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. [Emphasis added.] 15
It is clear from the text of this regulation that the pre-1954 law
and its corollaries are far from dead. In the stead of the "gift test" now
has arisen the "primary purpose" or "primary benefit" test. The decisions of both the Tax Court and the federal judicial courts to a great
extent have based this new test on the gift-compensation dichotomy
of the 1939 Code.16 The question of excludability invariably turns on
whose interests primarily are being served. The courts ask: Why was
the payment made?' 7 If it is determined that the payment was
compensation for services rendered or if the weight of the benefits
accrue to the grantor, the payments are found taxable. Unfortunately,
the test has yielded unpredictable results on numerous occasions.' 8 The
reason for this diversity of result is quite evident. Every grant by its
14 Items not considered as scholarships or fellowship grants for purposes of
section 117 are educational allowances to veterans and allowances to members
of the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither of these exceptions are pertinent to this examination and will not be considered here.
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1956). The entire subsection is quoted supra
note 2.6
' Elmer L. Reese, Jr., 45 T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742
(4th Cir. 1967); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960).
171n Chandler P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960), the Tax Court stated that
whether a grant would be considered excludible, ..... depends upon whether the
primary purpose of the payment is to further the education and training of the
recipient or whether the primary purpose is to serve the interest of the grantor."
[Emphasis
by the court.] Id. at 17.
' 8 Compare Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963), allowing exclusion to a
Markle Foundation scholarship recipient even though he continued as a full time
professor of physiology, with Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959),
where payments were found includible in gross income since the grants were
deemed not for the primary benefit of the grantee.
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very nature contains elements of both gift and compensation. 9 The
courts have explored the motives of the grantor in virtually all of the
cases, while virtually no consideration is given to what possible benefits are derived by the grantee.20 Although it would seem to be the
purpose of the Treasury in promulgating Treasury Regulation §
1.117-4(c) to clearly distinguish the scholarship provisions from the
gift sections of the Code, this effect has hardly been achieved. The
result has been a case-by-case determination, not based on outlined
criteria, but rather on the particular facts colored by the feelings of
the individual court deciding the issue.21
In holding Johnson's income to be excludable under section 117
of the 1954 Code, the circuit court's decision in the instant case became quite controversial. 22 The thrust of this decision 23 was that the
39 Although this point was recognized in Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d
355 (6th Cir. 1966), a grant to an employee of the Tennessee Department of
Welfare
was still found taxable, the court holding it represented compensation.
20
Confusion has resulted from several decisions considering only the
question of whether or not the payments were compensatory in nature. Once it
was determined that the payments were a form of compensation for services
rendered, the courts reasoned, ergo, the grants must have been for the "primary
benefit" of the grantor. Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966);
Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 889 (1968); Howard IAttman, 42 T.C. 503 (1964).
See Rev. Rul. 59-118, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 41.
A better view is set forth in Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901, 904
(W. D. Pa. 1958).
Under Section 117.4(c) of the Income Tax Regulations, whether a payment .. . qualifies as a scholarship or fellowship excludable from gross
income .. . depends upon a showing that the primary purpose of the
award is to further the education and training of the recipient in his
individual capacity as distinguished from an award the primary purpose
of which is to serve the interests of the grantor. Once the test of primary
purpose is satisfied, the fact that the grantor derives some incidental
benefit from the activities of the recipient does not of itself affect the
excludability of the amount received from income.
In William Wells, 40 T.C. 40 (1963), the court agreed with the reasoning in
Wrobleski:
[T]he language of section 117 and its legislative history make it clear
that amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant may be
compensatory in character and may still be excludable from income. Id.
at 49.
Rev. Rul. 65-59, 1965-1 Cur. BuLL. 67, adopts the holding in Wells. But see
Rev. Rul. 57-386, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 107.
21 The "primary purpose" test has not gone without the criticism of both
commentators and text writers. See, e.g., 1 J. MEBTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmm
TAXATION, § 7.42 (1962 rev.). The real fault, however, must lie with the
legislature in not setting out objective criteria and guidelines for both the
Service and the courts to follow.
In (Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c)) the Commissioner created a
restriction on the exclusion largely out of whole cloth in the form of
an exception to an exception which itself is subject to a reservation which
seems to state the original exception. Myers, Tax Status of Scholarships
and Fellowships, 22 TAx LAWYER 391, 396 (1968).
22 For a discussion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, see 21 ALA. L.
RBv. 23875 (1969).
Most notably in disagreement with Johnson were Stewart v. United States,

(Continued on next page)
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statute itself specifically referred to exceptions to the general rule that
scholarships and fellowships are not taxable. Subsection (b) (1) of the
1954 Code provides:
[S]ubsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount
received which represents payment for teaching, research, or
other services in the nature of part-time employment. . .
24
[Emphasis added.]
Further, subsection (b) (2) in describing the limitations of the section
on non-degree candidates proscribes exclusion of amounts in excess
of $300 per month for 36 months.2 5 By applying the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,26 the Third Circuit concluded that the provision of the regulations further expanding the
27
limitations to the "primary purpose" test were invalid.
The Supreme Court, noting that the Treasury Regulations are prima
;2
facie proper unless "plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,"
rejected the court of appeals' expressio unius reasoning. The anomalous
result, wrote the Court, could be the inclusion of a part-time teaching
assistant's income for tax purposes, while excluding the income of a
highly-salaried executive who is attending school. Indeed, the executive may still be performing those duties for which he receives his
salary. Such an inequitable situation could surely not have been
29
sanctioned or in fact compelled by Congress.
The !Court, in reviewing the legislative history of section 117, outlined its view of the congressional policy underlying the enactment of
the present statutory provision. Not only was Congress attempting to
eliminate the necessity of case-by-case determination based on individual facts, but, more importantly, it sought to give scholarships and
fellowships separate tax treatment based on their distinctions from
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966) and Ussery v.United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1961). See also Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967),
aff'g 45 T.C. 407 (1966) and Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th
Cir. 1963). For an interesting and informative discussion of these conflicts, see
Tabac, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-Round,
46 TAxEs 485 (1968).
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 117(b)(1).
25Id.
§ 117(b)(2).
2
6Literally, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Burgin

v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 170
Okla.27487, 40 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1935).
johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d. Cir. 1968). "his ruling seems
merely an attempt to write into the regulations a concept which was considered and intentionally rejected by the Congress which enacted the Code."

Id. at 260.
28 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
29 The Court has upheld the narrow interpretation of exemptions from
taxation. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949); Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46 (1940).,

CoMIMs
ordinary gifts. The Court emphasized that Treasury Regulation §
1.117-4(c) must be upheld since a reading of the entire section of the
1954 Code discloses no inconsistencies between the intentions of
Congress and the interpretation of the Treasury. This holding is
succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice Stewart:
One may justifiably suppose that the Congress that taxed funds
received by (part-time) teaching assistants, presumably on the
ground that the amounts received by such persons really represented compensation for services performed, would also deem
proper a definition of 'scholarship' under which comparable
are
sorts of compensation-which often, as in the present 3case,
significantly greater in amount-are likewise taxable. 0 [Footnotes omitted.]
The unquestionable quid pro quo relationship between Westinghouse and their employees led the Court to conclude on the facts
that the "stipends" were indeed compensation and not scholarships
under the intent of the 1954 Code.
It is significant that the Court upheld the "primary purpose" test
without specifically mentioning it by name. The relationship of the
employees' prior salaries and the "stipends," the requirement of
selection of a topic related to the work of the Westinghouse facility,
and the obligation to return for a period of two years, are facts
specifically referred to by the Court as a basis for its conclusion. All
are confined to the question of whether the payments were compensation. Although in the past this fact alone was not to be determinative of the taxability of grants, 31 the Court's decision in Johnson
indicates that the "primary purpose" test is not relevant if the grant
represents payment for past, present, or future services. Has the
spectre of the "gift-compensation" test of the pre-1954 Code days
reappeared?
Most certainly, the Court's decision in the present case is not surprising in light of the regulations and their support among the
courts of appeals. Definite policy problems arise when benefits accrue
to the grantor, even though the grant's purpose was the furthering of
the grantee's education.32 The commentators have been quick to point
out that since no specific criteria have been set out, any prediction of
outcome derived from specific facts must be based, in part at least, on
3
0Bingler
31

v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 754 (1969).
Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958). Cf., Rev. Rul. 65146, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 66, acquiescing in Aileen Evans, 34 T.C. 720 (1960)
and Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959). But see, Rev. Rul. 57-386,
1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 107.
32 See discussion and accompanying text supra note 20.
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some clairvoyant power.3 3 Almost as certainly, however, would a re-

vision of the regulations lead to new cases and new tests. To call the
regulations inartfully drafted would not be fair. It is clear that the
Treasury set out no criteria simply because to do so might have
subverted the policies of Congress in drafting the 1954 Code.34 Why,
then, did the Court choose for its first decision based on section 117,
a case which on its facts, could hardly have been decided in any other
way? In upholding Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c), the Congres-

sional policies as interpreted have been granted approval. By its
example, the Court's directive seems to deny exclusion only when the
payment is for employment activities which are economically beneficial to the employer.
The regulations are currently under review 35 by the Treasury and

consideration is being given to revision more nearly in line with the
holding in William Wells.3 6 In that case the Tax Court made it quite
clear that grants of a compensatory nature may still be excludable
from the income of the recipient. The Court in Johnson hinted that
even if this change is effected, where there is a bargained-for quid
pro quo agreement, the present decision would not be modified. Although legislation may be required to set forth sound criteria for the
exemption,37 the Court's decision in Johnson should bring some muchneeded order to the tax law of scholarships. 3
Leslie C. Smith
33
3 See, e.g., 1967 ILL. L.F. 326.

4A discussion of these policies and a functional approach to their implementation is discussed in Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 144.
35 The regulations have been in line for revision for at least five years.
Several revenue rulings have indicated that the Service will follow the decisions
of the courts until the proposed revisions are published. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 65-59,
1965-1 Cum. BULL. 67.
3640 T.C. 40 (1963). Wells was enrolled in a Veterans Administration
training program and as such received payments for clinical research. The services
performed were not required by the VA at that time or in the future. The court
allowed the grant as a fellowship even though compensatory in nature. Any other
construction, said the court, would "neatly [eliminate] all university research
fellowships which are conducted under the university direction and supervision."
Id. at 49.
37 The recently passed Tax Reform Act of 1969 (Act of December 30, 1969,
Pub. 3L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487) does not affect section 117.
8 It is noteworthy that two Tax Court cases decided subsequent to the
Johnson decision have cited that case as upholding the validity of the "primary
purpose" test. Marjorie Schwartz, CCH TAx CT. MEMO. 1969-151 (July 17,
1969); Jonathan M. Kagan, CCH TAx CT. MEMO. 1969-118 (June 16, 1969).
Apparently future cases will be determined on the basis of this "test" until the
new regulations are promulgated or new legislation enacted.

